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Abstract
New measures imposed by governments, Internet ser-
vice providers and other third parties which threaten the
state of privacy are also opening new avenues to protect-
ing it. The unwarranted scrutiny of legitimate services such
as file hosters and the BitTorrent protocol, once relatively
unknown to the casual Internet user, is becoming more ob-
vious. The darknet is a rising contender against these new
measures and will preserve the default right to privacy of
Internet users.
A darknet is defined in the context of file sharing as a
network which operates on top of another network such as
the Internet for the purpose of secure and private distribu-
tion of digital material. While there are other darknet ap-
plications in existence, such as Freenet, WASTE again, and
Relakks, they harbour some caveats. Whether they be pro-
prietary solutions, depend on other services, are prone to
feature creep or have security shortcomings, there is room
for improvement.
The aim of this paper is to address and improve on some
of the problems of these alternative darknet clients with
the development of a lightweight darknet application suite -
Umbra. It is then demonstrated how its deployment can cir-
cumvent or defeat the draconian measures currently threat-
ening privacy in the public domain.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the Internet has become heavily policed
with the aim of quashing the distribution of illegal materi-
als whether they infringe copyright or are of another dubi-
ous nature. Applications such as peer to peer software and
companies providing file hosting services are being heav-
ily scrutinised, held responsible for the distribution of these
materials and in some cases even made illegal. The mea-
sures imposed by Internet service providers and the courts
on behalf of the firms responsible for the protection of copy-
righted material have had major repercussions on the state
of privacy in the public domain.
Two predominant measures threatening the state of pri-
vacy are filtering and traffic shaping. File hosting compa-
nies have been the subject of litigation by parties represent-
ing several large record labels. Mandates were passed down
to remove all copyrighted material and implement a scheme
of filtering measures to ensure the prevention of repeat up-
loads of any such materials to their servers. While this may
seem a fair avenue of action from the perspective of the
record labels, it is also imperative to take into account the
impact of such actions on privacy.
Traffic shaping on Internet service provider networks
is a relatively new public concern. Some Internet service
providers openly advertise they throttle traffic associated
with the BitTorrent protocol. While legislation surrounding
traffic shaping and net neutrality is under current global re-
view, introducing tiered services dependant on traffic types
does present a violation of privacy. The content of Inter-
net users’ traffic is not directly analysed yet, but the type of
traffic is certainly categorised and routed accordingly. This
has ramifications in terms of network neutrality of course,
but from a privacy perspective it also constitutes an over-
stepping of bounds as users traffic is subject to analysis and
may be hindered due to choice of protocol.
There are several legitimate usage scenarios for these
sorts of services. Home users sharing photographs or
videos, small businesses distributing company documents
or their products to customers, distributed software develop-
ment projects or educational schemes hosting material for
remote participants are all prime examples. The BitTorrent
protocol has provided a medium for citizens of oppressed
countries where censorship is a major obstacle to provide
free media coverage of the situation within their countries
and to communicate with the outside world.
One possible remedy to the current trend of privacy in-
trusion is the deployment of a darknet. A darknet, in the
context of file sharing and this research, is defined as a net-
work operating on top of another network, such as the In-
ternet, in a closed or private manner. The content of data
exchange is hidden from users outside the network or lack-
ing sufficient authorisation. This can be achieved in a num-
ber of ways, the most common being encrypting all traf-
fic between nodes. In other networks, anonymity provided
through proxy servers or onion routers is used alongside en-
cryption. While there are some darknet applications in ex-
istence, it seems most of them either lack features, such as
a complete security scheme or stand alone capability, which
may be deemed important or, at the other extreme, are prone
to feature creep. Other problems include the lack of porta-
bility, dependence on other services or are propriety solu-
tions.
The aim of this paper was to develop Umbra, a darknet
suite, which incorporates the good features of some of the
current solutions in existence, improves upon their some of
their weaknesses and introduces new features. Umbra will
address the myriad of problems facing privacy on public do-
main networks such as the Internet and will target scenarios
where interception and analysis of data is probable.
2. Related Work
The word privacy is generally an ill defined but widely
understood term. A common correlation amongst the var-
ied definitions is the availability, or lack there of, of infor-
mation on a given subject or individual whether they be pri-
mary or derived via analysis [1]. In some countries, privacy
is guaranteed by law or constitution, such as human rights
acts or bills concerning electronic data protection. Many
cases however see these documents superseded by more re-
cent mandates and edicts passes down by higher echelons
like the EU parliament or global agreements like the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. In this research, privacy
is defined as the right of Internet users to not have their elec-
tronic data in any form analysed or processed by any third
party. This will include packet inspection, traffic analysis,
and any means to discern the methods of privacy assurance
such as cryptanalysis or the defeat of tools used to provide
privacy. As the current situation stands, there are a number
of core problems facing privacy. These range from techni-
cal problems such as filtering or traffic shaping measures
imposed by governments and Internet service providers to
social problems such as a lack of awareness surrounding the
subject of privacy.
Filtering is a relatively new problem facing privacy in
the public domain. Its introduction largely coincides with
the spate of litigations by firms representing the major
recording labels against hosting companies, Internet service
providers and to some extent BitTorrent tracker sites for the
hosting or trafficking of copyrighted music. These services
themselves are, of course, not responsible for the copyright
infringement however, but the people who are copying these
materials and uploading or distributing them. The copy-
right firms, however, see the service providers as a less dif-
fuse target and therefore focussed their legal attack on them.
This has had a unilateral effect on the services, penalising
users across the board; both legitimate and illegitimate. For
example, Rapidshare’s .de domain were the subject of le-
gal action instigated parties representing Sony, Universal,
Warner and many other major record labels to remove copy-
righted material and implement content filters to prevent
copyrighted material from being uploaded. The company
also agreed to submit the user information of the uploader
to avoid paying hefty fines [2]. The issue has not affected
file hosting services only. The onslaught of the record labels
has extended to BitTorrent tracker sites and Internet service
providers also. Websites such as Mininova have installed a
content recognition system which detects and removes tor-
rent files linking to copyright infringing material in a move
to mitigate the looming legal ramifications from BREIN,
an anti-piracy foundation. Largely the problem with these
content filtering systems is that they are prone to produc-
ing false positives. Without human interaction, copyright
free data such as free documentaries, royalty and copyright
free music or even home movies could be flagged and re-
moved merely because they have a title similar to a box of-
fice movie or top of the pops hit. Noteworthy is the fact
that the installation of this software did not satiate BREIN’s
legal pursuit against the website [3].
Network neutrality, an increasingly discussed topic as of
late, is closely related to privacy in the public domain. The
incorporation of traffic shaping measures into Internet ser-
vice providers networks has been highly controversial and
constitutes a violation of network neutrality and privacy.
The concept of traffic shaping essentially entails analysing
protocol headers of data packets to determine their prior-
ity given a particular set of heuristics, then routing them
according to their ranking by the outcome of this analysis.
What results is a tiered service, where the traffic of pro-
tocols they deem of high priority are routed before those
of other protocols. This has become common practice for
many Internet service providers to implement what they
stipulate is a scheme to ensure quality of service to all cus-
tomers. At times of peak network usage, however, this hi-
erarchical scheme begins to become a hindrance to lower
prioritised services.
American Internet service providers, such as Comcast,
openly defend their use of traffic shaping, with particular
reference to the BitTorrent protocol [4]. They insist that
this is a measure to promote unilateral quality of service to
all customers at all times of the day, and to a lesser extent,
help combat the distribution of copyrighted material. Bit-
Torrent, the now notorious peer to peer protocol geared for
the distribution of large amounts of data in peer to peer net-
works, became a natural target for discrimination in traffic
shaping schemes. Not only has it become increasingly as-
sociated with the distribution of pirated software, films and
music, but also accounted for about fifty to ninety percent
of Internet traffic in 2008/2009 [5, 6]. To Internet service
providers, this means congestion. While the content of traf-
fic is not yet directly analysed, the filtering of the protocols
being used means a violation of privacy for users.
In countries such as China and Iran, citizens are sub-
ject to heavy electronic censorship measures at the hands
of their governments. There are a number of factors which
contribute to the success of censorship policies. An over-
bearing government presence seems to be centric to begin
with. Countries where people can be imprisoned or exe-
cuted for merely expressing their opinion in public usually
coincides with a national censorship scheme to silence any
would-be opposition to the government. These schemes
extend from vetted television broadcasts to the installa-
tion of government surveillance software on computers, as
is the case in China, to the blocking of sites where anti-
government propaganda and a platform for free speech re-
side, as is the case in Iran. State sponsored privacy vio-
lation is not limited to the Eastern hemisphere, however.
The Culture of Fear [7] spouts phrases such as “national
security” and “terrorism” allow governments to pass dubi-
ous anti-privacy legislation in countries such as Ireland, the
UK and the USA. While these issues are non-trivial, they
are abused to spread fear, uncertainty and doubt amongst
citizens to allow the installation of increasingly pervasive
censorship measures.
3. Umbra DarkNet System Design
The darknet developed in this project uses a hybrid cen-
tralised network topography. This consists of a server,
whose sole purpose will be to authenticate clients and grant
them access to the darknet, and peer to peer clients which
will make up the darknet itself (See Figure 1). A centralised
network suits real world deployment scenarios; A single en-
try point into the darknet is advantageous as it negates the
requirement for clients to know the IP address of an on-
line node as is the case in a purely decentralised topogra-
phy. Using a central authentication server results in only
trusted users being able to gain access to the darknet and
also facilitates for simple addition and removal of trusted
users should the web of trust break down. Registered dark-
net accounts also prevent spoofing as is possible on WASTE
Again meshes.
The design of this darknet provides some immunity
to server failure. The client application is a hybrid
client/server. This means that independent from the server,
the client can receive darknet connections so in the event of
server failure the darknet stays up. Server failure may be
detected when an offline client attempting to enter the dark-
net is presented with a network error indicating the server is
unreachable.
The security of a successful darknet is multi-faceted.
Trust and privacy are two of the core areas of the design
Figure 1. An overview of the Umbra darknet.
in this regard. As mentioned in section 1, cryptography is
used to ensure the private and secure transmission of data
between darknet nodes, but it also lends itself to the in-
tegrity of trust on the darknet as a whole. Darknets can
be described as being built on a web of trust. While users
at nodes may have personal relationships and trust one an-
other, it is important from a security point of view to defend
against subversion of the darknet and mitigate the impact
of node compromise. Umbra makes provisions for security
on these two fronts by implementing a hybrid cryptosystem
consisting of a symmetric cipher for bulk data encryption
and a public key algorithm for symmetric key distribution
and peer verification. A more detailed discussion of this
system is presented in section 4.
To ensure secure transmission of inter-nodal data, the de-
sign of Umbra includes the use of end to end encrypted
streams. This makes only the sender and receiver privvy
to the content of the data being transmitted. This is an im-
provement over the WASTE Again client which uses link
level encryption, whereby any node on the darknet can in-
tercept and interpret data, which creates a massive vulner-
ability to a “break-once-break-everywhere” (BOBE) attack
[8, 9]; the compromise of a single darknet node compro-
mises the entire darknet. Further improvements are made on
the WASTE Again client with respect to the cryptographic
layer of the darknet. The design of Umbra darknet improves
security further by implementing the symmetric cipher used
in the cryptographic layer in CBC mode, as opposed to
PCBC mode which WASTE Again uses and is known to
have vulnerabilities [10].
In designing Umbra, the breakdown of the trust rela-
tionship in the darknet is accommodated for. The popular
WASTE Again client does not provide a means of removing
compromised or untrusted nodes from a mesh. Instead, the
entire mesh must be torn down and rebuilt. Umbra, how-
ever, allows the simple addition and removal of registered
users’ accounts from the authentication server, thus prevent-
ing their future entry into the darknet.
Security, although paramount, is not the only concern of
a successful darknet application; usability plays an impor-
tant role also [11]. As already discussed, the addition and
removal of trusted nodes is made simple by the addition
and removal of users’ accounts on the server (a set of bash
shell scripts aid the performance of these tasks in the cur-
rent prototype). This is not the only area in which Umbra
delivers usability, however. An intuitive user interface is vi-
tal to make the functionality of the client available to a wide
demographic of users. Umbra boasts a standalone built in
GUI which sought to improve on the shortcoming of the
Freenet darknet client requiring a web browser to serve this
purpose. Much time has been dedicated to the design of
the frontend. The use of tooltips, meaningful informational
messages and an overall clean, lightweight interface deliv-
ers a user friendly experience to users of varying technical
proficiency.
In their paper, Biddle et al [8] suggest the functional-
ity of a darknet should facilitate the introduction of objects
into the darknet, the ability to search remote users’ reposito-
ries for files of interest and the copying of these files across
the darknet to their local machine. The design of Umbra
is based on these prerequisites. Users have a shared direc-
tory on their local machine through which they make files
available to the remainder of the darknet. These directories
are remotely searchable by other users on the darknet and
the files therein may be copied to a user’s own machine in
a secure and private manner via the darknet. In addition to
these functions, an instant messaging feature has also been
included in Umbra and which is secured in the same fashion
as searching and file transfers.
4. Implementation and Evaluation
Umbra is written in C and C++ with the current suite of
user space tools written in bash shell script. The OpenSSL
cryptographic library and Nokia’s Qt framework provide
the cryptographic functionality and GUI respectively.
The cryptographic and networking layer is central to the
secure functionality of Umbra. Not only does it ensure the
secure transmission of data across the darknet, but it also
preserves the integrity of the web of trust. By encrypting
data, it’s content known only to the sender and receiver and
the absence of plaintext application layer packet headers
in data sent over the Umbra darknet provides some immu-
nity to application layer based traffic inspection schemes.
Planned future improvements in the area of immunity to
traffic analysis are discussed in section 6.
As previously mentioned in section 3, Umbra uses a hy-
brid cryptosystem consisting of a symmetric cipher for bulk
data encryption and a public key algorithm for key distri-
bution and peer verification. The latter functionality is han-
dled in a secure handshake, which is discussed later in this
section. Symmetric ciphers are far less computationally ex-
pensive than public key algorithms making them suitable
for encryption of large amounts of data. Umbra uses sym-
metric encryption for all traffic once the secure handshake
has taken place. Early prototypes used the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) as a symmetric cipher. In the
duration of development, the news of the cryptanalysis of
AES192/256 [12] led to the long term security decision to
switch to the Blowfish cipher of which, currently, there is
no publicly known cryptanalysis.
Figure 2. The Umbra connection handshake.
A public key algorithm, RSA, is used for key distribution
and peer verification. Both tasks are carried out as part of
the secure handshake, which is negotiated when a new con-
nection is made on the darknet, either between clients on the
darknet, or between client and authentication server. The
premise of the handshake, illustrated in Figure 2, is sim-
ple. The symmetric keys and initialisation vectors used for
symmetric encryption are derived from a cryptographically
secure, high entropy source, namely the OpenSSL pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG). Thus, these keys are ex-
tremely difficult to precompute which makes them suitable
as tokens for peer verification. The parties exchange sym-
metric keys and initialisation vectors, one pair for each di-
rection of communication, using one another’s public RSA
keys. If the returned copy of either matches the sent copy,
both parties can determine one another’s identity and con-
tinue the transaction securely using symmetric encryption
with the exchanged keys.
The Umbra server application acts as the entry point into
the darknet. To gain access to the darknet, clients must first
authenticate successfully with the server. The login mecha-
nism is two phase. Clients must first successfully handle the
handshake challenge from the server to verify their identity
and then password authenticate to the server with the user-
name and password associated with their registered account
on the server. This two phase mechanism mitigates the risk
of node compromise as an attacker would need to obtain a
user’s password in addition to a copy of their private RSA
key in order to gain access to the darknet and masquerade
as that user. As an additional security measure, passwords
are stored as SHA256 hashes to prevent attackers obtain-
ing this information in the event of a successful breach of
the machine running the server. When clients successfully
authenticate to the server, the server then synchronises the
client with the details of the other online darknet clients and
notifies the other online clients of the new client’s entry into
the darknet.
The Umbra client is the application through which the
user interfaces with the rest of the darknet. After success-
ful authentication with the server, the client becomes a peer
to peer application which accepts and handles connections
from other nodes on the darknet. The darknet functionality
outlined in section 3 is implemented in the client applica-
tion: Clients may share files with other users on the darknet
by copying the file into their shared directory on their local
machine; Clients may search one another’s shared directo-
ries remotely for files of interest; Clients may copy files of
interest to their own machine via the darknet; Clients may
send instant messages to one another. All of this functional-
ity is performed on top of the cryptographic and networking
layer which ensures all data is transmitted securely and pri-
vately over the darknet.
Testing and evaluation of Umbra was carried out in both
LAN and WAN environments on a relatively small dark-
net consisting of 20 nodes. A range of tests were carried
out from the domain of security, usability, performance and
functionality in the most objective manner possible. Evalu-
ation was based on the results of these tests combined with
user feedback.
Overall, Umbra performs quite well. The security of the
cryptographic and networking layer and the server authen-
tication mechanism has proven resilient to attack. The ex-
tent of the security tests included masquerade attacks, simu-
lated node compromise and in the case of the server, replay
attacks. The strength of the security of the cryptographic
algorithms used is of course assumed secure until a break-
through in quantum computing arrives or cryptanalysis of
these ciphers is successful.
From a performance perspective, the overhead of the
cryptographic and networking layer on the client side is not
noticeable under average load, but becomes more signifi-
cant under heavy load, for example, when several file trans-
fers are being executed concurrently in the client side appli-
cation. The threading architecture used is currently under
review in the aim to remedy the impact of heavy load on the
host machine.
5. Discussions
This paper has outlined the development and deployment
of the Umbra darknet and demonstrated it’s potential effec-
tiveness against the encroaching threats to privacy on pub-
lic domain networks. Umbra aims to continue to improve
on the shortcomings of current darknet solutions and intro-
duce new features to broaden it’s defence against the pri-
vacy threats highlighted in sections 1 and 2.
There are, of course, social ramifications to the use of
darknets on public domain networks. While the Culture of
Fear does spread fear, uncertainty and doubt and uses these
as tools to perpetuate the violation of privacy, such issues
as child protection and terrorism are legitimate concerns.
There is the possibility that child pornography rings may
use darknets as a tool for the distribution of illegal materials
or terrorists using them to disseminate instructions to carry
out attacks. This possibility, however, should not herald
the ban or stigmatisation of darknets; These criminals may
also use the same technologies that the public use to carry
out financial transactions online, or access online medical
records yet these technologies are not subject to the same
scrutiny as darknets.
The so-called rise of piracy in the advent of high speed
Internet connections has been used as a scapegoat for the
current economic climate to enforce unfair and legally du-
bious sanctions on legitimate services such as third party file
hosters and BitTorrent trackers. Darknets provide a suitable
replacement for these services and allow users to share data
with only the people they trust. This implies the suitability
of darknets in the corporate, education and home domains.
6. Future Research
Currently, Umbra is still in alpha stage of development.
With just a few fixes and optimisations to be implemented,
the project is nearing a beta release. There are many
planned additional features to come in future versions of
Umbra. As mentioned in section 4, immunity to various
forms of traffic analysis will be implemented in a later ver-
sion. These include link saturation and protocol obfusca-
tion, two features implemented in the WASTE Again dark-
net. The planned link saturation mechanism will consist of
false connections and junk data exchanges as well as junk
data sent over legitimate darknet connections. This will pre-
vent the ability of using traffic analysis to determine when
legitimate data is being sent or deriving the size of a file or
message as it is transmitted across the darknet. The ability
for Umbra to obfuscate it’s protocol will prevent it’s detec-
tion by packet inspection mechanisms and avoid throttling
by traffic shaping schemes.
Restrictive firewalls which allow access to only specific
services present a problem to darknet users such as those
in countries ruled by oppressive regimes who implement
pervasive censorship schemes. Reverse connections would
allow users to instead make outgoing connections to other
darknet clients wishing to connect to them. This feature will
be implemented in a future version of Umbra.
Another major feature which would add an additional
layer of privacy is support for anonymous proxy services
such as the Tor onion router. Alongside the highly secure
cryptographic and networking layer in Umbra, support for
anonymity would further mitigate the impact of node or
server compromise as the real IP address of a node would
be masked by the proxy service. Combined with the other
proposed features in this section, Umbra will deliver a ro-
bust, highly secure and private darknet solution to the open
source community and make the preservation of privacy ac-
cessible to the widest demographic possible.
7. Conclusion
Recently, privacy has become scarce on public domain
networks such as the Internet. Threats such as filtering, traf-
fic shaping and large scale pervasive censorship schemes
have left many users without refuge for securing their data
as it is transmitted over these networks. While it is foolish
to forecast the future as the privacy and security landscape is
ever changing, the current trends in online privacy indicate
that darknets will play a role as a “last bastion” for users
who feel their right to privacy is threatened.
Umbra aims to be a valuable asset in the toolkit of
anyone concerned with proactive protection of their privacy
amongst the emergence of global anti-privacy action and
legislation. These threats are ever evolving and inevitably
open new avenues of privacy protection. The development
of Umbra will be ongoing and will strive to defeat or
circumvent these new threats as they arise. As a wise man
once said;
“The Net interprets censorship as damage and
routes around it.”
– John Gilmore, Co-founder of the EFF.
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